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ASEAN Economic Community and the European Experience
I. Introduction
At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1 Heads of Government meeting in Phnom Penh in 
November 2002, participants proposed that members consider the creation of an “ASEAN Economic Community” 
(AEC) by 2020. Naturally, the name is evocative, for “Economic Community” immediately summons up the 
European experience. In fact, when APEC was “reinventing” itself, someone proposed that the acronym “Asia-
Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation” should be replaced with “Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Community.” This was rejected 
explicitly because APEC did not want to give the impression that it intended to move toward the EC model—too 
controversial. 
For ASEAN Heads of Government to consider an economic community, even with the baggage the term carries, 
is really nothing new. ASEAN has always carefully studied the progress of European economic integration and 
viewed it as something of a “role model,” though within the context of Southeast Asia’s development. In this 
paper, we will consider what lessons the European experience might hold for ASEAN, as well as offering some 
suggestions—based in part on the EU experience—as to how ASEAN might evolve into an AEC. We begin 
with a brief look at the context of how ASEAN interacts economically, particularly in terms of trade, using some 
comparison with the early years of the EU. Section III follows with a review of the evolution of ASEAN economic 
integration, culminating in the AEC concept. Section IV delineates salient lessons of the EU experience for 
ASEAN. And ﬁnally, in Section V we offer suggestions as to how the AEC might proceed.
II. Intraregional ASEAN Context
In 2004, ASEAN intraregional trade was 22% of total trade (Table 1). Intraregional trade as a percentage of 
total trade was highest for Myanmar (45%) and Laos (33%). In terms of value, Singapore was ﬁrst, followed 
by Malaysia, though it should be noted that Singapore’s share was particularly high as it handles considerable 
intraregional entrepot trade. Within ASEAN, the trade share was lowest for Cambodia (8%) and the Viet Nam 
(13%). Outside of the region, approximately 14% of ASEAN exports were destined for European Union (EU) 
markets, less than the 16% to the United States (US) and over 12% going to Japan. The EU was the most 
important single market for four ASEAN countries (Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, and Viet Nam); the US was the 
largest market for Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand, with Japan largest for Brunei Darrusalam, Indonesia, and 
Philippines. The “Triad” (the EU , Japan, and US) also dominate foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows to the 
region.
Hence, ASEAN has its most important economic partners outside the region, and any view of its regional 
economic integration must be appreciated in this context.. As discussed below, this important fact is key to why 
ASEAN economic integration has been mainly geared toward “open regionalism.” The cost of an inward-looking 
approach to regionalism, or “Fortress ASEAN,” would be far too high. Regionalism in developing countries that 
have focused on an insular approach have generally failed (e.g., the Latin American Free Trade Area). It would 
be a disaster in ASEAN’s case.
European economic integration, therefore, stands in contrast to the ASEAN process. As we argue below, the EU2 
1The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
2There is a difﬁcult acronym issue in this paper: the European Union (EU) was the successor to the European Community (EC), 
which integrated the various economic communities in Western Europe, including the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). We use EU throughout the paper for simplicity, even if we are actually referring here to 
the EEC.2
3Hiemenz, et. al. (1994), Table 2, p. 8.
4ibid.
Table 1: ASEAN Exports to Selected Partners: 2004
  World  ASEAN 
6





CER US NAFTA EU-
15
($ millions) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Brunei Darrusalam 4,511 17.2 17.2 4.5 38.1 73.9 35.8 14.1 8.6 8.7 2.6
Indonesia 71,550 17.1 18.2 6.4 22.3 55.6 37.8 2.9 12.3 13.3 12.2
Malaysia 126,510 24.0 25.1 6.7 10.1 51.3 44.8 3.6 18.8 19.9 11.8
Philippines 39,680 15.5 17.2 6.7 20.1 54.8 35.0 1.3 18.2 19.2 16.4
Singapore 179,674 22.0 24.3 8.6 6.4 53.2 50.7 4.2 13.0 13.7 13.7
Thailand 96,245 18.1 22.0 7.4 14.0 50.4 38.5 2.9 16.1 17.7 14.3
ASEAN 6 518,170 20.5 22.6 7.4 12.2 52.9 43.9 3.5 15.2 16.3 13.3
Cambodia 2,589 3.0 7.5 1.1 3.5 12.5 9.1 0.1 55.9 60.0 25.5
Lao PDR 540 19.4 32.8 2.1 1.3 36.5 35.3 0.1 0.6 1.9 27.0
Myanmar 3,161 44.6 45.3 5.9 5.2 58.5 66.2 0.4 0.0 0.6 15.5
Viet Nam 25,850 11.4 13.0 9.0 13.6 39.5 26.4 7.2 20.1 21.5 22.5
ASEAN-10 545,799 20.2 22.2 7.4 12.2 52.1 43.0 3.6 15.5 16.6 13.8
ASEAN 6 = Brunei Darrusalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
ASEAN = ASEAN-6 plus Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam
PRC = People’s Republic of China
JPN = Japan
ASEAN + 3 = ASEAN plus PRC, JPN, and Republic of Korea
CER = 
NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement
EU-15 = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, CD-Rom, April 2006.
in earlier stages of economic integration maintained fairly high levels of trade protection. This was reinforced in 
the 1950s by the European Payments Union, which discriminated in favor of intra-EU imports. These policies 
implied considerable costs in terms of lost welfare, and certain institutional arrangements that emerged from the 
EU integration process continue to be expensive to the EU—the Common Agricultural Policy, for example. Still, 
in its early stages the share of intraregional EU trade and investment was far higher than in ASEAN today. In 
1958, the ﬁrst year of the implementation of the European customs union, intra-EU trade was about 37% of total 
trade3. By the time the customs union was completed, it was over 50%.4 Today, it is about 60%. 
It is also relevant that intra-ASEAN trade has been essentially market-driven, rather than being the result of 
policy-driven discrimination in favor of intraregional economic interaction. Again, this contrasts with the EU case. 
Nevertheless, while one could argue that the growth in intraregional trade in the EU was in part a result of 
discrimination, it is important to consider the historical context: in Europe during the 1950s and early 1960s, with 
the region still emerging from the devastation of World War II. Although it would be difﬁcult to assess the effect of 
economic reconstruction (complications in devising an “anti-monde” are many), the growth over this period was 
no doubt the result of a “normalization process” and the pace of Europe’s growth relative to the rest of the world. 
Certainly, given the size, wealth, and distance of European economies, a gravity model would predict high levels 
of intraregional trade even in the absence of EU discrimination. 
This is not the case for ASEAN. Even if ASEAN—by some deﬁnitions a “natural economic bloc”—trades much 
more than one would expect given the “gravity variables” noted above (see, for example, ADO 2002 and Frankel 3
1997), the economic characteristics of its members would suggest that its most important trade and investment 
partners will continue to lie outside the region, at least in the medium-term, and probably in the long- run as 
well.
In sum, real economic integration within ASEAN has been quite different from that of the EU. Intraregional trade 
and investment are less than in the ASEAN case. The highly-divergent levels of economic development within 
ASEAN, whose members are both among the poorest and the richest developing economies in the world, are 
far more signiﬁcant than in the early years of the EU, when each EU member was a developed economy, or at 
least was by the end of the 1950s. One needs to keep this in mind when trying to draw any lessons from the EU 
experience for ASEAN’s future integration. While no two development experiences are going to be the same, 
we would still argue that the EU process and experience has many positive and negative lessons for ASEAN 
policymakers. 
Box: The Economic Integration of Europe: An Overview 
Arguably, there were three primary motivations for economic integration in Europe in the aftermath of World War II:
(i) to avoid wars of such magnitude, destruction, and loss of life; (ii) to draw markets and resources together for economic 
(and social) reconstruction; and (iii) to build a strong, integrated region as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (the 




Western Europe started to move toward economic integration in the early 1950s at a sector level with the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), created under the Treaty of Paris (1951). The group included Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands, and West Germany. The European Payments Union was created to ration then scarce 
US dollars. Then in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) were established by the same six nations under the two so-called “Treaties of Rome.” The EEC Treaty of 
Rome created what was essentially a customs union “plus” (with part of the “plus” the eventual incorporation of the 
Common Agricultural Policy). Sector schemes—the ECSC and Euratom—were integrated with the EEC and called the 
“European Communities” (EC) in 1967, after the European customs union was implemented. The Single European Act 
(1986) modiﬁed the EEC Treaty of Rome and sought to create a truly integrated common market in Western Europe—
where goods, services, capital, and labor could ﬂow freely. This was done via 284 sweeping directives. While the goal 
to complete the Single Market was stipulated to be the end of 1992—hence the sobriquet “EC-1992”—the directives 
were only essentially in place in 1994. There still areas to be liberalized in certain European Member Countries (in 
the ﬁnancial services sector). While the Single Market Programme progressed, EC leaders turned their efforts toward 
monetary integration, culminating in the Maastricht Treaty (1991), which eventually established the European Union 
(EU) and created the conditions for eventual monetary union. In 1999, 12 of the 15 EU members (Denmark, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom opted out) adopted the “euro” as a uniﬁed currency, permanently ﬁxing individual monetary 
units at a predetermined rate to the euro. This was prior to adopting the “hard euro” in 2002, when currencies were 
completely replaced.
Economic Widening
In early 1960, the United Kingdom (UK) expressed an interest in joining the EEC, but its application was rejected 
(vetoed by then French President Charles de Gaulle). However, the UK—along with Ireland and Denmark—joined 
during the 1973 First Enlargement of the EC. Greece joined in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1985. The main purpose 
of this recruitment was political: all were emerging from authoritarian regimes and the EC wanted to foster democracy 
by successfully integrating them into European institutions. The Fourth Enlargement brought in Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden in 1994 (Norway and Switzerland also had accession agreements with the EC, but these were rejected during 
national referendums). Thus, by the mid-1990s the EU-15 covered almost all countries in Western Europe. Central and 
Eastern European countries, however, remained outside the EU framework. Still, the EC placed high priority on drawing 
in Central and Eastern European countries, especially given the delicate state of their ﬂedging democratic institutions 
after the 1989–1991 revolutions. Most recently, the May 2004 Fifth Enlargement accepted 10 Central and Eastern 
European countries—Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, along with the 
small Mediterranean states of Malta and Greek-Cyprus. Bulgaria and Romania are slated to be the next to join (though 
it is not exactly clear when), and Turkey is currently negotiating accession terms (albeit Turkey’s membership remains 
highly controversial within the EU).    4
III. Evolution of ASEAN Economic Integration in a Regional Context
There have been many excellent surveys of regional economic integration in Asia (e.g., Kawai 2005, Naya 
2002, Asian Development Bank 2002).5 ASEAN tends to stand at the core of Asian integration, at least from an 
institutional perspective. Here we provide a brief review of ASEAN’s evolution within a regional context.  
 
There are several factors that inﬂuence the current trend toward regionalism in East Asia. These stem directly 
from the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis: (i) the obvious contagion of the crisis, which demonstrated the policy 
externalities across countries in ASEAN and the newly industrialized economies (NIEs); (ii) the widespread 
disappointment with the US reaction to the crisis, which left the region feeling “being in it alone together;” 
(iii) APEC’s  disappointing  progress  toward  closer  trade  and  ﬁnancial  cooperation,  as  well  as  development 
assistance cooperation (“ECOTECH”); (iv) Japan’s offer to create an Asian Monetary Fund during the crisis—
opposed by the IMF and the US—gave the impression that Japan wanted a more proactive role in the region; 
(v) arguably, the decision of the People Republic of China (PRC) not to devalue its currency during this period 
helped create a sense of solidarity; (vi) the “New Miyazawa Plan,” launched in October 1998, which allocated 
$30 billion to help spur East Asia’s recovery (and was deemed highly successful);6 and (vii) the IMF policies 
promulgated to address the crisis that were deemed inappropriate, giving greater credibility and impetus to an 
“Asian approach.” 
Given these factors, the crisis itself set the stage for more serious and durable East Asian regionalism. There are 
many other internal and external forces at work that have expedited this process, such as the rise of regionalism 
globally and its potential negative effects on the region the successful example of the Single Market Program 
in Europe (discussed at length below) and eventual monetary union; general pessimism regarding what can be 
achieved via the World Trade Organization (WTO) in light of its failure to move forward at the Seattle and Cancun 
ministerial meetings; and the potential inherent beneﬁts of free trade agreements (FTAs). 
There have been many important initiatives in Asia on preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), particularly 
within ASEAN, and ASEAN + 37 (Table 2). 
Most of ASEAN’s early agreements were political or token in nature.8 Its ﬁrst major initiative was the 1992 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). With the exception of the Japan-Singapore FTA (Japan-Singapore 
Economic Partnership Agreement), which came into force ten years after agreement, AFTA is the only example of 
cooperation in is the region similar in concept to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, 
in true ASEAN fashion, rather than overly commit to regional integration in sensitive areas, the speciﬁcs of AFTA 
were purposefully left ambiguous, with the agreement basically committing members to free trade over a 15-
year timeframe. Also, “free trade” was somewhat loosely deﬁned, as it left tariffs in the 0–5% range rather than 
the traditional 0%.9 After the original agreement, ASEAN broadened the scope of goods covered by AFTA and 
shortened the implementation period such that AFTA was technically in full effect at the beginning of 2004 for 
the ﬁve original ASEAN countries plus Brunei Darrusalam—though there are transitional periods for products on 
the temporary exclusion lists (e.g., sensitive products such as rice and automobiles in some cases), and some 
country-speciﬁc implementation problems in certain areas. The original target for full implementation was 2006 
for Viet Nam, 2008 for Lao PDR and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia. Recently, ASEAN decided to accelerate 
5This brief review of ASEAN integration borrows from Plummer (forthcoming) and Naya and Plummer (2005). 
6Kawai (2005).
7ASEAN+3 includes the 10 ASEAN members plus People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Republic of Korea.
8For example, the Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) was a positive-list approach to trade liberalization with small margins of 
preference and limited product coverage. It was expanded somewhat during the 1980s but had no real impact on trade. Industrial 
cooperation, such as the ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP) system, never really took off. 
9In fact, this range of tariffs probably contradicts the requirements spelled out in Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO, but as was noted 
earlier, ASEAN beneﬁts from the Enabling Clause, which has always freed it from these constraints.5




Results ASEAN + 3-related
Summit
Results
1976 1st—Bali, Indonesia ASEAN Concord 
•  ASEAN Secretariat 
established
•  Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia signed (principles of 
independence, sovereignty, 
equality, territorial integrity, 
and national identity of all 
nations, noninterference in 
internal affairs and peaceful 
resolution of disputes 
•  Zone of Peace, Freedom, 
and Neutrality (1971 
Declaration) established
1977 2nd—Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia
•  Basic Agreement on 
ASEAN Industrial Projects—
framework for ASEAN 
Industrial Joint Ventures 
(AIJVs)
•  ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements (PTA)
1987 3rd—Manila, Philippines •  Improve the PTA
•  Increase ﬂexibility of AIJVs to 
accelerate implementation
1992 4th—Singapore •  ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) adopted 
using a Common 
Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT) Scheme as 
primary mechanism for 
implementation
1995 5th—Bangkok, Thailand
1996 1st informal—Jakarta, 
Indonesia
•  Request for ministers to 




•  ASEAN Vision 2020 
presented, to advance 
economic integration 
and cooperation, with an 






Japan Joint Statements on 
Cooperation
1998 6th— Hanoi, 
Viet Nam
Hanoi Plan of Action 
•  Advance AFTA to 2002, 90% 
intra-trade subject to 0–5% 
tariff
•  ASEAN Investment Area 
(AIA)—liberalization by 2010, 
outside ASEAN by 2020
•  ASEAN Surveillance Process 
strengthened
•  Develop ASEAN Capital 
Markets
•  Eminent Persons Group 
(EPG) proposed to come up 




East Asian Vision Group 
(EAVG) proposed by Kim Dae 
Jung, President of Korea to 
discuss long-term East Asian 
integration
Table 2: Chronology of ASEAN and ASEAN+3 Integration6
1999 3rd informal—Manila, 
Philippines
EPG develops plan for Vision 
2020:
•  Concern that ASEAN not 
effective in responding to 
Asian Crisis, so proposed 
ﬁnancial cooperation.
•  Speed up AFTA
•  Accelerate AIA 
•  To respond to surge of PRC 
economic development, need 
to become more competitive, 
attract investment, faster 
integration, and promote IT
3rd—Manila, Philippines
2000 4th informal—Singapore Adopted Initiative for ASEAN 
Integration (IAI):
•  Framework for more 
developed ASEAN members 
to assist less-developed 
members when needed
•  Focus on factors to enhance 
competitiveness for new 
economy: education, skills 
development, and work 
training
4th—Singapore East Asian Study Group 
(EASG) to assess the 
recommendations of the EAVG 
and explore the idea and 
implications of an East Asia 
summit: 
•  Develop of institutional link 
between Southeast Asia 
and East Asia 
•  Study creating an East 
Asian Free Trade Area 
(EAFTA) and investment 
area
•  Begin ﬁnancial 
cooperation, such as the 
May 2000 Chiang Mai 
Initiative 
•  Study an ASEAN-PRC 
FTA
2001 7th—Brunei Darussalam Challenges facing ASEAN:
•  Declining FDI, erosion of 
competitiveness. 
•  Road map for ASEAN 
integration by 2020
•  Move beyond AFTA and 
AIA by deepening market 
liberalization for both trade 
and investment
5th—Brunei Darussalam •  ASEAN+3 formally 
established
•  EAFTA recommendation 
endorsed, but 
overshadowed by  
proposal for establishing a 
PRC-ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement proposal within 
10 years, with adoption 
of the Early Harvest 
Provision to speed the 
process
•  A Japan-ASEAN 
Economic Partnership was 
proposed in response
•  Japan-Singapore 
Economic Agreement for 
a New Age Partnership 
announced (signed 
January 2002, coming into 
force 30 November 2002)
2002 8th—Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia
•  AEC end-goal of Vision 2020 6th— Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia
Adopt EASG recommendations 
for deepening and broadening 
East Asia’s integration
2003 9th—Bali, Indonesia 7th—Bali, Indonesia
2004 10th—Vietianne, 
Lao PDR
•  -Vientiane Action Plan




PRC accelerates FTA with 
ASEAN to 2010 from 2015
Note:
In 1998, 1999, and 2000 the PRC offered to advise ASEAN, a potentially controversial proposal for leaders of other ASEAN+3 member 
countries, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Source: Adapted from Naya and Plummer (2005).7
cooperation, e.g., in the form of ASEAN “one-stop investment centers” and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA).10 
These efforts at industrial cooperation have been designed with essentially the same goal in mind as AFTA—
reduce transaction costs associated with intraregional economic interaction. 
As already mentioned, ASEAN Heads of Government proposed in November 2002 that the region consider the 
possibility of creating an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2020. This explicitly placed the EU experience 
front and center in terms of design, but clearly with ASEAN characteristics. The ASEAN leaders actually agreed, 
at the October 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, to create a region where goods, services, capital, and 
skilled labor would ﬂow freely, even if the details remain to be worked out. We offer our own recommendations 
in the penultimate section, colored by the EU experience. 
The reasons behind the decision to create the AEC are many, including (i) the desire to create a comprehensive 
post-AFTA  agenda;  (2)  the  perceived  need  to  deepen  economic  integration  within ASEAN  given  the  new 
international  commercial  environment,  especially  the  dominance  of  free-trade  areas  (FTAs);  (iii)  given  this 
environment, the possibility that bilateral FTAs could actually jeopardize ASEAN integration, as all members 
were free to pursue their own commercial-policy agenda; and (iv) the recognition since the 1997 Asian  ﬁnancial 
crisis that cooperation in both real and ﬁnancial sectors must be extended concomitantly, and that free ﬂows of 
skilled labor would be required to do this.11
In addition to an ebb in progress on APEC’s Bogor Vision of open trade and investment, several events have 
shifted ASEAN’s focus to its East Asian neighbors. First, even with the successful initial APEC summits at Blake 
Island, US (1993), and Bogor, Indonesia (1994), the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) concept never 
faded away. On the contrary, it began to grow in substance. Strangely, the initiative derived from ASEAN’s effort 
to expand economic cooperation with the EU, and accepting the EU’s desire to instead deal with all of East Asia. 
This led ASEAN to ask PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (Korea) to participate.12 The ﬁrst Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) was held in Bangkok in March 1996, with ofﬁcials from ASEAN, PRC, Japan, and Korea meeting 
with EU representatives—a format that has continued semiannually since. Even though the initial impetus for 
these meetings was economic cooperation with the EU, the signiﬁcance for East Asian regionalism is that these 
meetings brought ASEAN, PRC, South Korea, and Japan together to discuss issues of economic cooperation. In 
1997, these meetings culminated in an informal summit of the 13 Heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur.
The original “Miyazawa Plan” was initiated by Japan during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis to create an Asian Monetary 
Fund (AMF) to supplement the IMF. This was vehemently opposed by the IMF and the US, but eventually led to 
the establishment of the Chiang Mai Agreement—a series of currency swap arrangements among East Asian 
countries (largely bilateral swaps between Japan and the other countries) on the sidelines of ADB’s May 2000 
annual general meeting in Thailand. 
Generally, ﬁnancial integration is a complicated process. Usually it occurs well into the process of regional 
integration, as happened with the EU and the creation of the euro (discussed below), which was only possible 
after decades of a customs union and a common market. In East Asia’s case, FTAs have become the focus 
because the beneﬁts of monetary cooperation are less clear—as the direction of trade is heavily weighted outside 
the region for most countries, the value of exchange rate stability within East Asia are more limited than they 
were in the EU’s case. Also, the political beneﬁts have thus far been less obvious than in the EU experience.
10A salient component of the AIA is the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) scheme, which offers more in terms of tariff (0–5%) and 
nontariff incentives than traditional industrial cooperation programs. Moreover, ASEAN signed an Agreement for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (September 1996), which includes simpliﬁcation of investment procedures and approval processes, as well 
as enhanced transparency and predictability of FDI laws.
11The free ﬂow of all labor, including unskilled labor, was deemed too politically difﬁcult to consider in the AEC.
12ASEAN plus PRC, Japan, and Korea formally became ASEAN+3 in 2001.8
APEC’s lack of inﬂuence during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis served to solidify East Asia’s move in favor of the 
ASEAN+3 approach. The current spate of agreements, however, has not been extended throughout ASEAN+3, 
but rather derives more from ASEAN to individual countries. For example, the completion of the “China-ASEAN 
joint FTA study” in the summer of 2001 prompted Japan to quickly initiate a study of its own with ASEAN. 
One month later, at the November 2001 ASEAN+3 meeting, ASEAN and the PRC announced their intention 
to negotiate a free trade area within 10 years (the agreement was formalized in a Framework Agreement in 
December 2004). 
III. Lessons from the EU 
Before assessing any lessons that can be derived from the EU experience, we begin with several caveats 
concerning differences in the subjective environment facing the EEC in the 1950s and that facing ASEAN 
today:
•  The institutional environment facing ASEAN in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century is far different than 
that of the EEC in the 1950s. European integration was clearly pushed both by memories of a devastating 
war and emerging Cold War tensions. Political and social motivation for economic integration were far different 
than ASEAN’s today—though it should be added that ASEAN has been instrumental in keeping the region 
peaceful, an important contribution that is often underestimated. The “European Good” is interpreted much 
differently in Europe than the “ASEAN Good” in ASEAN. This considerably limits institutional development 
at many levels. Importantly, it reduces the possibility of relinquishing power to supranational organizations. 
Besides, such institutional development is difﬁcult within the ASEAN context, given that (i) nation-state 
formation was much later than in the European context, and in some countries must still be given strong 
priority; (ii) divergence in socio-political institutions are far greater than they were in Europe, especially as some 
European countries had to recreate these institutions after WWII; (iii) it is not clear that European institution-
building has been particularly successful in all areas, though it would receive high marks in economic-related 
matters (though this hypothesis might also be tested); and (iv) European institutions are quite expensive 
with ASEAN government budgets much smaller (fortunately, ASEAN would not have to employ an army of 
translators, as the EU does). That said, it is important to note that the notion of the “ASEAN Good,” though 
viewed differently within the ASEAN context, has evolved over the past decade. For instance, 10 years ago, 
few in the region (or the rest of the world for that matter) knew what ASEAN was. Today, it is well known. 
•  The international economic environment is far different today than it was in the 1950s. First, the 
contemporary global marketplace is extremely open relative to the past. Extensive reductions in international 
trade barriers—due to GATT/WTO rounds along with some unilateral liberalization—and the huge increase in 
international capital ﬂows (including FDI), which increasingly knit an integrated global marketplace, underpin 
this wholesale shift. Thus the costs of using regional integration as a form of “Fortress,” that is, to maximize 
trade diversion, are consequently much higher than they were at the time the EEC entered its formulative 
stage. Second, regionalism has rapidly expanded recently; trading groups reporting to the WTO are well over 
200, with the majority established after 1995. Some of these groupings include ASEAN’s most important 
trading partners, which could potentially isolate ASEAN as well as force it to pay costs of trade diversion. 
These trends further underscore the need for an AEC to ensure openness that it be actively engaged in 
the regionalism movement. The more integrated the ASEAN marketplace is, the easier this will be. These 
considerations were far less important when the EEC was organized.
•  ASEAN features far greater diversity in terms of economic development. We mentioned in Section 
II that ASEAN is far more diverse in levels of economic development than was the case of the EU in its 
earliest phases, when all members were developed. While the expansion of the EU to include the 10 Central 
and Eastern European countries in May 2004 signiﬁcantly increased the EU’s diversity, the region remains 
dominated by developed countries and is far more symmetric than ASEAN, which features developed, 
“dynamic Asian economies;” middle-income developing countries; and least-developed countries. ADB noted 
in its Asian Development Outlook 2002 that the coefﬁcient of variation (standard deviation divided by the 
mean) on income levels within ASEAN was 1.6 with a mean per capita income of $1,975 in 2000, whereas 
the corresponding numbers for the EU were 0.6 and $20,747. Hence, the divergence within ASEAN is far 9
greater than that of the EU, and the countries are far poorer. This suggests that matters related to the speed 
of implementation of an AEC, and even the ability of ASEAN to include all its members in the process, will be 
complex and difﬁcult. Phased “10-X” strategies, which are what AFTA in effect embraces, may not only be 
desirable but necessary. 
 
•  ASEAN is far more open now than Europe was in the 1950s. ASEAN countries are small in economic 
terms and very open relative to the EEC of the 1950s—and even with respect to most EU countries today—
with the exception of the transitional CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Viet Nam) economies. ASEAN 
members are closely integrated with global markets by trade as well as multinational networks. This is also 
a policy focus for ASEAN governments. As noted in Section II, intraregional trade and investment in ASEAN 
is far less important than it was for the EEC in the 1950s. As external trade will likely continue to overshadow 
intraregional trade for the foreseeable future, one would expect an AEC to be much more outward-looking 
than the EEC/EC might have. Also, even as an integrated market, ASEAN countries taken together still 
would not inﬂuence international terms of trade (as an AEC would still be relatively small in global terms), 
suggesting that the optimal common external tariff should be zero. This was not the case with the EEC.
Having noted these caveats, there are at least three major lessons from the real-side integration of the EU. 
First, on the negative side, ASEAN should avoid some of the pitfalls that inward-looking discrimination brought 
on the EU (especially in agriculture), and would be potentially catastrophic in the ASEAN context. Intra-ASEAN 
trade is less than 25% of its global trade compared with about 66% for the EU, indicating that ASEAN members 
are already globally savvy. Hence, any real-side economic cooperation must be outward-looking, which is why 
ASEAN leaders ostensibly want to use ASEAN as a means of “going global“—some scholars have noted that 
AFTA is actually more of an investment agreement than a trade agreement; free trade reduces intraregional 
transaction costs and presents to multinational corporations a vertically-integrated market. 
An AEC should never lose this vision, even when, as in the European case, compromises may have to be made. 
EU members are more developed, higher-income countries that together form a large economic space. They 
were able to push economic integration behind relatively protected markets, within an international economy that 
then remained fairly closed. Today, the GATT/WTO has opened up markets considerably and most of the world—
the EU and ASEAN included—have internationalized extensively. One could argue that the EEC’s protectionist 
approach toward evolving into the EU was not needed to begin with and in fact should have been avoided—the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been by many measures a disaster. Today, the cost of an inward-looking 
approach to integration has increased exponentially, and it is not a viable option for building an AEC.
 
Second—and partly related—is that the European experience illustrates that trade-investment links matter. And 
these relationships are shaping in large part the economic structure of ASEAN economies. While the CMLV 
ASEAN members remain at the early stages of the economic development process, the original ﬁve ASEAN 
countries have seen tremendous change in their productive structures in general, and in trade in particular. 
Primary-based exports (roughly estimated as SITC 0-4) have fallen in all the ﬁve economies.13 Only Thailand 
continues to have a large agricultural-export base—the largest rice exporter in the world, for example. But 
agricultural exports are also falling in importance relevant to other sectors. Energy (SITC 3) continues to be 
important to Indonesia and Malaysia, with Indonesia currently a marginal oil importer. The most impressive 
change in the region—in some cases extraordinary—is the rise in share of SITC 7, or electronics and transport 
equipment (for ASEAN, this is primarily electronics). During the 1990s, the share of SITC 7 increased in all 
ASEAN countries—it accounted for 72% of total exports in the Philippines, 68% in Singapore, 58% in Malaysia, 
and 41% in Thailand during the period.14
 
While economic reform has played an important role in this process of structural adjustment, so has foreign 
investment. Tamamura (2002) uses input-output analysis to capture the FDI-export link in East Asia, as well as to 
decompose the effect of external demand (by country) on production, using electrical and electronic products as a 
13Data for this structural-change analysis come from Plummer (2003).
14The Philippines case is both most dramatic and surprising. The value of SITC 7 exports more than doubled during the decade, with 
the largest increases in SITC 723 (civil engineering and contractors plant and parts), SITC 728 (machine & specialized equipment), 736 
(machine tools), 751 (ofﬁce machines), and 752 (automatic data processing machines).10
case study. He ﬁnds that, for 1995 (his latest year), in four of the ﬁve original ASEAN members, external demand 
induced greater production than domestic demand (the exception was Indonesia, where domestic demand fell 
marginally in relative importance, from 87% to 52%. Most countries used a similar pattern to internationalize 
electronics production. The most extreme case of reduced domestic demand was in Malaysia, where it accounted 
for a mere 6% of total production. 
Also, most of the directives that led to the creation of a tightly-integrated market for FDI in Europe came with 
the Single European Act, started in 1986–87 and essentially created a common market by 1994. The European 
experience shows that establishing a common market goes well beyond mere national treatment or most-
favored-nation treatment in the regional marketplace: economic cooperation must reduce myriad transaction 
costs associated with FDI, including those related to the labor market, mutual recognition of product standards, 
and the like. An AEC will have to focus per force on many of these areas. 
A third lesson relates to how the EU gained from intraregional trade liberalization (though, as noted above, this 
could have been better organized to minimize trade diversion). The customs union was important in building a 
regional market; the SEA, by creating a Common External Commercial Policy, and was more effective as it kept 
real-side transaction costs within the EU to a minimum. It produced a truly regional marketplace, resulting in a 
more efﬁcient division of labor in most member countries. 
For an AEC, the stress should be on global economic interaction more generally—of which the ASEAN market 
is only one part—not merely with expanding the intraregional marketplace. With this, an AEC could become an 
international springboard. Trade and investment integration policies in ASEAN should be expected to achieve 
the same general results as they did for the EU. But it could actually manifest itself in a different way, given the 
fact that ASEAN members are so diverse with most developing countries. To reiterate: an AEC should be a 
means of increasing economic prosperity and promote the social good rather than focusing on, say, increases in 
(sometimes misleading) indicators, such as shares of intraregional trade and investment. A successful integration 
program could theoretically lead to a decrease in regional integration, as measured by trade and investment 
shares.15  
A ﬁnal point involves ﬁnancial and monetary cooperation and integration, though in part this goes beyond the 
traditional interpretation of an AEC (discussed below). ASEAN has considered the formation of an ASEAN Bond 
Market, though problems related to liquidity, potential market depth and the like have led ASEAN to look more 
toward an Asian Bond Market. This will be a long process.16 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile looking at what 
happened in Europe, given that empirical studies (e.g., Frankel and Rose 1998) have shown that monetary 
integration has strong effects on trade and investment ﬂows. Other studies (e.g., EU commission 2001) have 
suggested speciﬁcally that monetary union would have a far more extensive effect on trade ﬂows and economic 
integration than the SEA. 
In the past, nearly every regional economic integration program almost exclusively focused early on the real 
economy. Financial integration was always treated as separate, to be addressed at a later date. In many ways, 
this was less true during European integration, though the point is debatable. While the European Payments 
Union (EPU) was a ﬁnancial arrangement, it was merely ad hoc, and was quickly phased out as soon as European 
15 For example, a successful AEC that brings in higher FDI ﬂows from abroad—a key aim of the AIA—will not only reduce 
intraregional FDI but could also reduce intraregional trade, if multinationals take advantage of the attractive regional 
division of labor offered within ASEAN. Suppose that, as a result of the AIA, a Japanese automobile multinational set 
up production stages in Indonesia and Singapore, whereby it exports $2 billion in car components to Indonesia; adds 
$100 million in labor-intensive value added to production in Indonesia before exporting the semi-processed product 
to Singapore for further $1 billion in processing and then ﬁnally exporting back to Japan. This means that ASEAN 
intraregional trade would have changed at the margin by: exports to Singapore from Indonesia ($1.1 billion) divided 
by exports of Japan to Indonesia ($1 billion) plus imports of Japan from Singapore ($2.1 billion), or 35%, whereas 
extraregional trade would have increased by 65%. The point is that this could be a successful economic activity for all 
parties involved, but intraregional trade shares might fall anyway.
16 See, for example, Plummer and Click (2005).11
currencies became convertible. This was just as the Treaty of Rome began implementation. The EC did publish 
the Werner Report, which mapped out a plan for monetary union at a time of great turbulence within the Bretton 
Woods System (1968), and after the Bretton Woods System collapsed, it tried to create the 1976 European Snake, 
and eventually the European Monetary System, which expanded the Snake in March 1979. These attempts at 
exchange-rate cooperation were important because the “customs union plus” needed stable exchange rates in 
order to run well. Such cooperation was especially necessary for the CAP—created primarily to stabilize farmer 
incomes—which ﬂexible exchange rates put at risk (the country with a depreciating currency held advantage over 
a country with an appreciating-currency, which was incompatible with the acquis communautaire). Therefore, the 
EC had to develop a “green” exchange rate system, called “monetary compensation amounts” (MCAs), which 
prevented this “adverse” structural change. However, the system was very expensive: Pomfret (1997) suggests 
that the MCAs constituted over 15% of the huge CAP budget. 
Nevertheless, European capital markets tended to be substantially segmented until implementation of the SEA 
was fairly advanced. There had been early attempts to create a single banking market as early as 15 years after 
the Treaty of Rome, in 1972 (it was stillborn). And in 1977, the European Council established the First Banking 
Directive, which did very little to integrate markets.17 But these and other attempts only marginally integrated 
regional markets until the SEA initiatives. Today, the European banking system is far more integrated, but some 
aspects of ﬁnance remain among the few areas where the Single Market is incomplete. Capital controls were 
removed as part of the SEA program. 
In sum, even with the EU, ﬁnancial integration lagged behind real sector integration. The tendency as regions 
integrate seems to be to let ﬁnancial issues wait, but experience shows that this is an unwise policy. The Asian 
ﬁnancial crisis could be seen in this light. Prior to the crisis, APEC, for example, largely ignored ﬁnancial and 
monetary cooperation, while ASEAN did little itself. In creating an AEC, therefore, ASEAN leaders would do well 
to focus on ﬁnancial issues in tandem with real-sector integration.  
The lessons from the EU on monetary cooperation again underscore the difﬁculty of making comparisons, as 
relative economic-divergence problems remain critical. Nevertheless, the EU too is a diverse group, especially if 
one considers regions rather than countries. Also, ASEAN’s needs for economic cooperation are obviously quite 
different from those of the EU. While ASEAN integration may be popular within the region, it is less than it is in 
Europe, particularly among government leaders. In addition, various EU states had perennial macroeconomic, 
especially ﬁscal, problems. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) allowed affected members to implement 
necessary austerity measures in the name of European integration. The result has been a convergence in terms 
of interest rates, inﬂation, and other monetary variables, but only after a relatively long process. Yet the credibility 
of most of the ﬁve original ASEAN members is actually quite high in terms of monetary and ﬁscal policies, 
(especially for developing countries). Inﬂation tends to be quite low and most had either budget surpluses or 
essentially balanced budgets prior to the 1997–98 crisis. Today, most maintain large current-account surpluses. 
Still, there continues to be widely divergent interest rate spreads in ASEAN markets—convergence could have 
a major impact on development in certain countries (as discussed below).18
Thus, the favorable EU political or political-economic dynamics cannot be considered as important for ASEAN. 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the situation is changing. ASEAN leaders acknowledge 
that “policy externalities” exist, that some sort of restrictions on the conduct of monetary and ﬁscal policy could 
not only improve the macroeconomic environment within ASEAN but also promote regional economic stability. 
Also, the possibility of competitive exchange-rate devaluations could damage the establishment of an AEC. 
Political arguments for wanting to be part of the EU for European countries would be replaced in the ASEAN 
context by a fear to repeat the economic damage caused by the 1997–98 ﬁnancial crisis. Cooperation in the 
conduct of monetary or ﬁscal policy could be done formally within or outside the AEC framework, without any 
pretension for or against initiatives leading to monetary union.
 
17Story and Walter (1997) note (p.14) that of the EU’s 9,434 credit institutions at that time, 429 were classiﬁed as foreign banks, and 
only 107 had a parent company based in a member-state. Governments were reluctant to grant licenses.
18See, of example, Plummer and Click (2005).12
Based on the EU experience, ASEAN ﬁnancial and monetary cooperation could bring several beneﬁts: (i) creating 
the necessary Maastricht-type agreements—e.g., restrictions on budget deﬁcits, government debt, inﬂation, even 
foreign-currency exposure of the banking system—perhaps interpreted more liberally than in the EU context, but 
would accompany efforts to create a more stable macroeconomic ASEAN environment, and thus build signiﬁcant 
positive policy externalities; (ii) as monetary policy would likely be driven by the country or countries with the 
best international or regional credit ratings, lower-rated countries would be able to “import credibility”—much as, 
for example, Italy was able to import German monetary credibility; (iii) interest-rate spreads would converge, 
making it easier to price risk at the regionally, lowering the cost of capital; and (iv) harmonizing rules, accounting 
standards,  and  regulatory  frameworks  in  building  an AEC  and  associated  ﬁnancial  initiatives  would  make 
ASEAN more attractive to foreign investors, as well as stimulate intraregional capital ﬂows.19 It would also make 
cooperation and even institutional integration of ASEAN equity and ﬁxed-income markets easier, something 
partially occurring in the EU (e.g., smaller stock markets have integrated while larger markets continue to operate 
separately). 
 
The process of ﬁnancial and monetary cooperation is complicated, and effective integration demands a steady 
pace of progress—rather than abrupt changes which could prove counterproductive. The EU process of ﬁnancial 
integration and exchange-rate cooperation on the way to monetary union is instructive. The European Currency 
Unit (ECU) was a basket of EC currencies, weighted by members’ GDP and foreign trade (and therefore subject to 
periodic change). Introduced in 1979 as part of the European Monetary System (EMS), it was to be a benchmark 
for evaluating an individual currency’s relative value and to serve as a unit of account among participating central 
banks. No ECU specie ever circulated, so it was a strictly artiﬁcial denomination. However, certain European 
banks created a banking product for lenders and borrowers to transact in ECUs. Initially, any ECU transaction 
was simply a portfolio of transactions in underlying currencies—an ECU deposit or loan typically was recorded 
as separate deposits or loans in individual currencies. However, banks soon established a clearing mechanism 
for the ECU, enabling ECU transfers without forced to make separate transactions in each of the component 
currencies. This allowed greater acceptance of the ECU in private commercial transactions—residents could use 
the ECU as a unit of account for bank deposits, while companies could use it for invoicing sales or maintaining 
accounts. The ﬁrst ECU-denominated bond was issued in 1981, just two years after the introduction of the 
basket. The ECU subsequently became a signiﬁcant “currency” for Eurobond markets, outranked only by the US 
dollar and the German mark. A substantial amount of ECU-denominated bonds were placed privately as well.
ECU use for private transactions rapidly developed as the ECU exchange rate tended to be more stable than 
those of its component currencies. For European investors and borrowers, a depreciation of the home currency 
against other currencies was offset by an increase in the home-currency value of the ECU, so there was an 
incentive to hold ECUs to diversify portfolios. Similarly, outside investors and borrowers were drawn to the ECU 
due to the lower risk compared with individual currencies. In short, the ECU was an attractive alternative because 
it was less sensitive to single currency volatility.
On 1 January 1999, the euro replaced the ECU with parity—part of the ﬁrst stage of European Monetary Uniﬁcation 
(EMU). The fact that the ECU existed for twenty years prior to the EMU suggests that a simple introduction of 
a currency basket is valuable, perhaps even necessary, as a precursor to closer monetary cooperation. The 
success of the ECU was partially due to its ofﬁcial status within the EMS, which helped bind participating central 
banks. Also, the fact that the private sector found the pan-European currency useful and that the banking system 
was able to accommodate increasing demand for ECU transactions aided in guaranteeing its success. 
IV. On Building an ASEAN Economic Community
Given ASEAN’s tremendous diversity, how can it create its own “customs union plus,” even by 2020? Tariff 
dispersion rates across ASEAN are indeed impressive. While ASEAN members tend to have fairly low tariffs and 
19 For a more complete discussion of the potential beneﬁts and costs of ﬁnancial market cooperation and integration in ASEAN, with 
comparisons with Europe, see Plummer and Click (2005) and Click and Plummer (2005). 13
nontariff barriers (NTBs) relative to other developing countries (except for transitional ASEAN economies), they 
still vary considerably across the region. The EEC did not have this problem. Moreover, within ASEAN, Singapore 
is unique with essentially no tariffs. Given the openness of its economy (over 300% of GDP), Singapore cannot 
raise tariff rates to accept any ASEAN Common External Tariff above zero. Options include a complete free trade 
zone in ASEAN, perhaps with some external tariff harmonization, or a “10-X” customs union, in which the common 
external tariff would be determined by negotiations (similar to those of the EEC), but without necessitating all 
ASEAN members to join. 
It is not clear exactly what form an AEC will take. Some scholars have suggested a less-ambitious approach, 
including an “FTA-plus” arrangement, which would include certain elements of a common market, e.g., free-ﬂow 
of capital, free-ﬂow of skilled labor, zero tariffs on intraregional trade, but would not include a common external 
tariff. Given the European example, where markets continue to be segmented and key beneﬁts of integration 
are stymied without integrated external tariffs, Plummer (2005) recommends a more ambitious approach—that 
a 0–5% common external tariff in an AEC should at least be explored for the more developed ASEAN countries. 
ASEAN might accept exceptions in very few industries that might be integrated later on—as the Common Market 
of the South (or MERCOSUR) did with automobiles, yielding mixed results. While perhaps more difﬁcult to 
implement, this option would have the effect of substantially reducing transaction costs in the region; mitigating 
any trade diversion potential of regional integration; increasing ASEAN’s ability to negotiate integration accords 
with other trading partners, and augmenting clout in international organizations. This could be a critical step in 
turning ASEAN into a truly open marketplace. 
This is not foreign to ideas ASEAN leaders have previously proposed, e.g., the Philippines-tabled proposal 
to multilateralize AFTA cuts. Also, many ASEAN countries have already committed themselves to “open trade 
and investment” by 2020 as part of APEC’s 1994 Bogor Vision. True, it is unclear just how the Bogor Vision will 
be achieved, or even what it means for that matter: details are incomplete and many ambiguities persist. Still, 
ASEAN tariffs and NTBs have fallen over time in any case and will continue to do so, as part of Uruguay Round 
commitments, any eventual Doha commitments (if negotiations are ever concluded successfully), and the overall 
liberal posture of ASEAN leaders. 
In  this  sense,  an AEC  could  be  viewed  as  a  purely  outward-oriented  community—“Fortress ASEAN”  was 
never an option. And why not create an essentially open region? The economic argument for protectionism is 
extremely weak, as ASEAN leaders recognize. Some might continue to adhere to the infant-industry argument. 
But this is more of an excuse for protectionism than any effective way of industrializing efﬁciently. There remains 
plenty of time before AEC 2020 for any industry to handle the transition. Besides, to make the infant-industry 
argument convincing, one must identify ﬁnancial bottlenecks that prevent ﬁrms from establishing industries with 
comparative advantage. This should not be a problem given the state of ﬁnancial markets in at least the ﬁve 
original ASEAN members.. In addition, this open-market solution does not mean that governments would have 
to abandon incentives for industry-speciﬁc development, should they desire to do so. Regardless of the merits 
of an active industrial policy, this remains possible even in an open customs union, as the European experience 
clearly shows. Even today, nearly a decade after the completion of the SEA and ﬁve years after monetary union, 
governments tend to maintain active industrial policies, e.g., through direct subsidies, special ﬁnancial and tax 
credits, and even de facto administrative rules. The EU does have formal restrictions, but they are constantly 
tested (e.g., the EU market in ﬁnancial services is far from complete). Tariffs have always been a clumsy way to 
foster industrialization, and NTBs tend to be even worse.
Naturally, transitional economies face an important challenge here. For example, until recently Cambodia sourced 
about 70% of government revenue from import-related taxes and duties. However, it is now reducing reliance 
on foreign trade-based taxes as part of its reform program. This is also true for other CMLV countries. Viet Nam 
has made tremendous progress and should join AFTA in 2006. Keeping its reform program on track to join an 
AEC 2020, however, will not be easy. Viet Nam is remarkable in the speed in which it has reinvented itself from a 
nonmarket, closed, and state-directed economy into an increasingly outward-looking, market-oriented economy. 
And this has occurred in less time than that remaining before an AEC is targeted to begin. It may even be 
possible for ASEAN to allow a longer-term transition period for Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, especially 
as there remain political uncertainties in these countries. 14
Regarding labor ﬂows, it would be politically difﬁcult to adopt the SEA approach of (technically) free labor mobility. 
Moreover, this isn’t necessary for ASEAN, at least from the point of view of multinationals or in terms of integrating 
the region with the global marketplace. Still, free ﬂow of skilled labor would be important, as would a regional 
framework for non-ASEAN nationals in obtaining visas.
However, the process will be difﬁcult, as it was in Europe. Mutual recognition of professional qualiﬁcations, 
university, technical education and the like will require a great deal of work. But this process will actually offer 
a good opportunity for the region—especially for the CLMV—to embrace “best practices.” It may well be that 
the process will be easier for ASEAN than it was for the EU, as there are fewer entrenched special interests or 
general resistance to reform on these type of governance issues. Many would, in fact, welcome this approach.
The idea of adopting best practices also extends to other areas that were important in the SEA, e.g., product 
testing, technical standards, food/health-related standards, among others. Mutual recognition will be necessary 
and, hence, develop the harmonization of at least minimum acceptable standards. Codes should borrow from 
internationally-accepted standards wherever possible. 
Attracting FDI is an important ASEAN priority. From the beginning leaders recognized the usefulness of a regional 
approach—with the largely unsuccessful attempts at industrial cooperation in the mid-1970s to the marginally 
more successful initiatives of the late 1980s and, ﬁnally, the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) in 1998. The AIA is 
surprisingly comprehensive—and once exclusion lists are incorporated, it will have far to go before creating an 
integrated ASEAN market. National policies will require increasing harmonization to establish a truly regional 
market. No doubt FDI will be a high priority in any AEC. But the vision of an integrated market for FDI can not 
happen without other AEC initiatives in place, working to reduce transaction-costs. 
Free-ﬂow of services, increasingly important throughout ASEAN economies, is required as well. The ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) takes a “GATS-plus” approach and is an important step toward 
creating an integrating market. For an AEC, services will not need a radical change in policies, as the third round 
of AFAS negotiations—which began in 2001—should cover all sectors and “modes” of service provisions deﬁned 
by the OECD (at least in theory. These are (i) cross-border supply—companies exporting services, for example, 
by fax or email; (ii) consumption abroad, —services consumed outside one’s home country, such as tourism; 
(iii) commercial presence—a company supplies the service directly to foreign customers from an established 
afﬁliate abroad (this covers over 75% of all trade in services; and (iv) overseas personnel—where the service-
exporting country relocates professionals or workers abroad to supply services. Any AEC will ultimately have to 
ensure a generally open market in services, without policy-induced discriminatory restrictions (including trade 
taxes), national treatment, and mutual recognition, for example. This was a difﬁcult process for the EU, where 
service subsectors remain quite sensitive. For example, for ﬁnancial services, the SEA stipulated three principles: 
(i) speciﬁc minimum requirements; (ii) mutual recognition of each members’ laws; and (iii) that the “home country 
principle” would prevail, whereby regulations of the country in which service occurs takes precedence over those 
of the host country. (Story and Walter 1997). However, the SEA did not succeed in fully integrating its ﬁnancial-
services sector; retail banking in particular continues to be segmented and protected nationally. Moreover, the 
“Services Directive,” designed to create a more integrated market in EU services (particularly in light of the EU 
2004 expansion), was rejected early in 2005.
So as AFAS expands as part of the AEC process, service subsectors need to be integrated carefully—their very 
nature is more complicated than the goods sector. Moreover, AFAS progress to date has been weak, and there 
is a reason for this: certain services are politically sensitive. Although exclusions should be kept to a minimum, 
speciﬁed sectors may require them.
An appropriate institutional framework is needed for the AEC to evolve effectively. In the early 1990s, the author, 
among a group of regional experts worked on a project—directed by long-time government ofﬁcials and scholars 
Amnuay  Viravan,  Cesar  Virata,  and  Seiji  Naya—that  proposed ASEAN’s  secretariat  enhance  its  technical 
abilities. Many of these proposals were adopted; and the Secretariat has come a long way. However, to reach 
the level of sophistication for an AEC, it still requires some drastic enhancements. A much larger professional 
staff recruited from across the region with regional—rather than national—commitment is fundamental, as was 15
the case with the EU. Many EU directorates could be emulated within an ASEAN context. But the study’s view 
is that the bureaucracy should be kept, to paraphrase Albert Einstein, “to the minimum possible but no less than 
that.” The ﬁrst reason for this is that the EU bureaucracy is simply too big and expensive. Second, the drain on 
human capital in ASEAN would be detrimental to other domestic policy priorities, an important consideration, 
especially for the CLMV. Third, at least in the ﬁrst stages of the AEC process, ASEAN could maintain its “social 
bureaucracies”—fairly substantial in the EU, and somewhat of a separate project. While these institutions were 
important in making the EU what it is today, ASEAN, as mentioned, operates within a very different socio-
political context. A fourth and related point relates to the creation of a “mini-state” within ASEAN, as happened 
within the EU, for example, developing an integrated executive, legislative, and judicial system. Because the 
EU’s willingness to develop supranational institutions is more the exception than the rule, ASEAN should try 
to minimize the supranational character of an AEC, using “subsidiarity” to its greatest extent. The executive 
component of ASEAN integration would have to be enhanced considerably, but this could arguably be done by 
adapting and expanding existing institutions. Or the creation of some sort of AEC judicial authority to “enforce” 
(hitherto a bad word within ASEAN) its rules will be necessary. No doubt this will be difﬁcult; after all, the EU 
continues to have its own problems (the Alstom case in France is but one of many good examples). And, as in 
the case of the EU, it would have to evolve gradually. 
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have tried to consider what the objectives and substance of an AEC should be, using wherever 
possible appropriate lessons from the world’s most successful example of regional economic integration, i.e., 
the EU. We note that while there is much that the EU experience can teach ASEAN, ASEAN leaders should not 
underestimate either the substantive differences between the two regions or their differing historical contexts.
EU integration has been remarkable. It took about 37 years for the region to become a truly integrated market—
from the 1957 Treaty of Rome until the implementation of the SEA, essentially completed in 1994. But it wasn’t 
until the process accelerated in the mid-1980s that integration initiatives picked up steam, culminating in monetary 
union only ﬁve years after the completion of the SEA. 
At times, some leaders and expert observers gave up on the EU; and the process certainly was familiar with 
“crisis.” In 1976, for example, France (temporarily) slapped import tariffs on Italian wine. In the early 1980s, 
market segmentation increased with the use of NTBs outside the purview of the EC, leading some to suggest 
that the EC was doomed. After the September 1992 crisis in the EMS, it was easy to be pessimistic about the 
future of a monetary union. And there continued to be skeptics to the end.
But the EU persevered due to its leaders’ commitment and evolution of critical social elements. This is a very 
basic lesson for ASEAN, particularly given the fact that an AEC will have to be far more comprehensive and 
“intrusive” in national markets than ever. It will take strong commitment indeed to move the process forward and 
maintain steady, positive momentum. 
No doubt this is why there is much skepticism regarding the AEC. It was no different in the case of AFTA: in the 
late 1980s, when many pundits speculated that as the region’s political exigencies had changed, ASEAN had 
no future as a regional organization. Instead, ASEAN leaders responded by moving forward impressively on the 
economic front, with AFTA the ﬁrst major initiative in this process. Since then, AFTA has expanded and deepened; 
cooperation has advanced signiﬁcantly in  investment (AIA); liberalization of services is actively pursued within 
the AFAS; other “deepening” measures are being spearheaded; and horizontal integration has expanded about 
as far as it can go, with ASEAN now comprised of all 10 Southeast Asian nations. While an AEC will require 
much more extensive commitment, it can become reality and to the beneﬁt of all if the ASEAN leaders have the 
political will to see it through. 16
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